

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5MONTEVIDEO 2419

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, UY  
SUBJ: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE: FY1980

REF: A) STATE 167901 (DTG 010215Z JUL 78) B) STATE 168320  
(DTG 031928Z JUL 78)

FOLLOWING IS ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
FOR URUGUAY, USING FORMAT OUTLINED PARA 3.A REF A.

1. U.S. INTERESTS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES -- THE  
PRINCIPAL CONCRETE ASSET WHICH URUGUAY CAN OFFER IN SECURITY  
TERMS IN CONTINUING ACCESS TO ITS PORT AND AIRFIELD FACILITIES  
AND DENIAL OF SAME TO UNFRIENDLY POWERS, IN LIGHT OF THE  
INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SEA LANES. THERE  
ARE NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS SERVED BY A  
SECURITY-ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH URUGUAY. SMALL, LIGHTLY-  
POPULATED AND FLANKED BY POWERFUL NEIGHBORS, URUGUAY IS NOT  
A REGIONAL MAKE-WEIGHT. ITS ARMED FORCES HAVE ONLY THE MOST  
LIMITED PRESENT CAPABILITIES AND FUTURE POTENTIAL.  
THUS, U.S. INTEREST IN A SECURITY-ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP  
LIES MORE IN POLITICAL THAN MILITARY TERMS. THE URUGUAYAN  
GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CONTROLLED BY THE MILITARY FOR SEVERAL  
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YEARS AND IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE SO, UNDER PRESENT  
TIMETABLES, UNTIL THE MID-EIGHTIES. THEREFORE, TO EXERT  
MAXIMUM INFLUENCE ON THE RULERS OF URUGUAY, SOME SORT OF  
SECURITY-ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP IS INDICATED -- WITHIN THE  
LIMITS IMPOSED BY URUGUAY'S NEGATIVE RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS.  
A MODEST AND APPROPRIATELY LIMITED SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAM, WHOSE IMPLEMENTATION DEPENDS ON URUGUAYAN HUMAN RIGHTS

IMPROVEMENT, WILL THUS PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE U.S. INCENTIVE IN ARGUING FOR PROGRESSIVE RESTORATION OF POPULAR FREEDOMS IN URUGUAY. THE PRESENT SMALL PROGRAM IS THEREFORE HEAVILY WEIGHTED TOWARD TRAINING AND THE MAINTENANCE OF URUGUAY'S EXISTING INVENTORY OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT. EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED, IT WILL NOT PERMIT MODERNIZATION OR REPLACEMENT. IT DOES MAINTAIN A LEVEL OF TECHNICAL INVOLVEMENT WITH URUGUAY'S MILITARY SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE CONTINUING ACCESS TO THEM. IT ALSO HOLDS OPEN TO THE GOU A REASONABLE EXPECTATION FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING RELATIONSHIP IF U.S. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ARE REALIZED.

2. URUGUAY DOES NOT APPEAR TO GIVE MUCH CREDENCE TO ANY CONVENTIONAL EXTERNAL THREAT, AND IT MAINTAINS CLOSE BUT CAREFULLY BALANCED RELATIONS WITH ITS TWO LARGER NEIGHBORS ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. URUGUAY DOES PERCEIVE A SERIOUS AND CONTINUING MARXIST/SUBVERSIVE INTERNAL THREAT, BASED ON ITS EXPERIENCE WITH THE TUPAMARO TERRORISTS. FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, THE TUPAMAROS WERE ELIMINATED BY 1973, WITH NO TERRORIST INCIDENT BEING REPORTED AFTER 1974. HOWEVER, IMPORTANT SECTORS OF THE GOU STILL REGARD THE SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP, MOST OF WHOM ARE EXILED IN EUROPE, AS A CREDIBLE THREAT TO URUGUAYAN INTERNAL SECURITY. THIS THREAT HAS BEEN COUNTERED THROUGH SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND CIVIL RULE, AUGMENTATION OF POLICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND THE CREATION OF A SEPARATE MILITARY

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JUSTICE SYSTEM TO PROSECUTE ACCUSED SUBVERSIVES. BECAUSE OF THEIR PRESUMED LINK WITH AND ESPOUSAL OF TERRORISM, MOST OF THE LEADERSHIP OF URUGUAY'S COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE NON-TRADITIONAL LEFT, TOGETHER WITH MANY LEADERS OF THE FORMER, MARXIST-CONTROLLED CNT LABOR CONFEDERATION WERE DETAINED IN THE PERIOD 1975-77. THE RESULTING INTERNAL OUTCRY, BASED ON OBVIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HAS GENERALLY BEEN VIEWED BY THE GOU AS MALICIOUS AND MARXIST-INSPIRED, OR AT BEST MISINFORMED, BUT IN NO CASE JUSTIFIED.

3. THE MISSION DOES NOT BELIEVE A SIGNIFICANT SUBVERSIVE THREAT TO URUGUAY PRESENTLY EXISTS. AS NOTED EARLIER, THE TUPAMARO MOVEMENT WAS DISMANTLED OVER FIVE YEARS AGO AND THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITY ENDED. THE COMMUNIST PARTY, LARGEMLY THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND

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OTHER FAR-LEFT POLITICAL FACTIONS DID POSE A CONVENTIONAL THREAT TO PUBLIC ORDER WHEN THEY WERE PERMITTED TO OPERATE. AT PRESENT THEY ARE OUTLAWED AND OFFER NO SOGNIFICANT THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY. THE CONTINUED SUSPENSION OF CIVIL RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES ARE AN UNNECESSARILY EXCESSIVE RESPONSE TO A PUBLIC SECURITY THREAT WHICH HAS LONG SINCE BEEN CONTAINED.

4. URUGUAYAN ARMY COMMANDS APPEAR TO PERCEIVE NO EXTERNAL GROUND THREAT AND THE ARMY IS ORGANIZED AND TRAINED FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE. THE PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE IS NOT EXPECTED TO CHANGE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. GROUND FORCES HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED THEIR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY IN COMBATTING THE TUPAMARO URBAN GUERRILLAS AND THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION WILL BE MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, ARMS, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, METHODS AND COMMAND LINES WILL BE MODERNIZED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE COUNTER-GUERRILLA ACTIVITY.

THE URUGUAYAN NAVY VIEWS ITS ROLE MORE AMBITIOUSLY UNDER CURRENT LEADERSHIP, BELIEVING THAT IT MUST BE PRE-PARED TO DEFEND AGAINST SEABORNE INVASION FROM NEIGHBORING CONFIDENTIAL

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BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA OR EVEN AN EXTRA-CONTINENTAL FORCE. IT ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES THE MORE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF POLICING THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE WITHIN URUGUAY'S 200 MILE LIMIT AGAINST ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION, AND PROTECTING URUGUAY'S MARITIME FONTIERS AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND OR

ILLEGAL EXPORTS. ACCORDINGLY, THE NAVY WISHES TO ACQUIRE SEVERAL MODERN FRIGATES WITH GOOD SEAKEEPING CHARACTERISTICS; UP TO FOUR SUBMARINES TO COUNTER INVADING AMPHIBIOUS FORCES; A FORCE OF THREE TO SIX MULTIPURPOSE (ASW, SURFACE SEARCH, AIR CONTROL) PATROL CRAFT; MORE AND NEWER PATROL AIRCRAFT AND SAR HELICOPTERS FOR ITS NAVAL AIR ARM; AND MAINTENANCE OF ITS MARINE CORPS AT THE 1000-MAN LEVEL.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO APPARENT AIR THREAT FROM URUGUAY'S NEIGHBORS OR ELSEWHERE, LOCAL AIR FORCE OBJECTIVES INCLUDE THE CONDUCT OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS, INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER SERVICES, TO PROVIDE AIRSPACE DEFENSE. AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED AND EQUIPPED, IT IS ILL-PREPARED TO MEET THIS GOAL, EVEN ON A SMALL SCALE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE LIMITED RESOURCES, ANTIQUATED EQUIPMENT, LOW AIRCRAFT-IN-COMMISSION RATES AND LIMITED AMMUNITION SUPPLIES. AIR FORCE COMMANDERS HAVE DEVELOPED A MODEST MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

5. URUGUAYAN ARMED FORCES HAVE NO REAL OR POTENTIAL SUPPORT TO OFFER FOR U.S. INTERESTS ON THE WORLD SCENE. OUR ONLY MILITARY INTEREST IN URUGUAY IS THAT ITS ARMED FORCES RETAIN A CERTAIN MINIMAL CAPACITY FOR INTERNAL PEACEKEEPING, AIRSPACE CONTROL AND OFFSHORE POLICING. THE LIMITED AND PRAGMATIC URUGUAYAN ARMY VIEW OF ITS ROLE IS IN ACCORD WITH U.S. INTERESTS, INSO FAR AS ITS COMMANDERS ARE COMMITTED TO THE RETURN TO AND FUTURE PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENT. THE NAVY'S IMAGINED ROLE IS OBVIOUSLY  
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EXAGGERATED AND THE ACQUISITION OF A SUBMARINE FLEET WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH U.S. INTERESTS. THE OTHERWISE MODEST UPGRADING OF PERFORMANCE WHICH IS ENVISIONED WOULD ACCORD WITH U.S. INTERESTS. THE MODEST UPGRADING ENVISIONED BY THE AIR FORCE HAS NO SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS. AS IN THE CASE OF THE URUGUAYAN NAVY, U.S. INTEREST LIES MORE IN OUR CONTINUING ACCESS TO SUCH FACILITIES AS PORTS AND AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DENIAL TO ANTAGONISTIC THIRD POWERS, WHICH A LIMITED SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP FACILITATES.

6. A MILITARY BUDGET OF \$79.9 MILLION WAS PROPOSED FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1977. THIS AMOUNT WAS 17.3 PERCENT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET AND 2.9 PERCENT OF ESTIMATED GNP. NO SPECIFIC SERVICE ALLOCATION IS AVAILABLE AT PRESENT. (DOLLAR VALUE WAS CONVERED FROM URUGUAYAN PESOS AT AN EXCHANGE RATE OF N\$3.80 EQUALS US\$1.00; THE CURRENTLY-PREVAILING EXCHANGE RATE IS APPROXIMATELY 6.2 TO 1.)

NO RELIABLE DATA IS AVAILABLE ON MILITARY IMPORTS IN RELATION TO TOTAL IMPORTS BUT THE PERCENTAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY SMALL. URUGUAY HAS GREATLY IMPROVED ITS RESERVE POSITION IN RECENT YEARS AND CURRENTLY ENJOYS A GOOD INTERNAL CREDIT RATING. LOANS FOR REASONABLE AMOUNTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT COULD BE OBTAINED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THE URUGUAYAN ARMY IS KNOWN TO BE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A SERIES OF HARDWARE PURCHASES IN ORDER TO MODERNIZE INFANTRY

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WEAPONS, UPGRADE ARMOR CAPABILITY, AND IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, THE ARMY WILL POSSIBLY BUY AN AMMUNITION PLANT SO THAT IT CAN BECOME COMPLETELY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN THIS AREA. THE NAVY IS CONSIDERING BIDS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THREE 40-50 METER PATROL BOATS WITH A MAXIMUM SPEED OF 25 KNOTS AND TEN DAYS ENDURANCE AT 15 KNOTS (VALUE ROUGHLY \$25 MILLION.) THE AIR FORCE MAY ALSO BE CONSIDERING NEW EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS BUT NO DETAILED INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE REGARDING THEIR INTENTIONS.

U. NOT REQUIRED.

8. NOT REQUIRED.

9. NOT REQUIRED.

10. NOT REQUIRED.

11. AS A RESULT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, THE SECURITY ASS-

INSTANCE PROGRAM HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED IN RECENT YEARS  
PURSUANT TO BOTH A CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE AND THE POLICY OF  
SUCCESSION ADMINISTRATIONS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM AROSE  
OUT OF THE GOU'S OVERLY PROLONGED REACTION TO A LEGITIMATE  
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INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT, THE TUPAMARO TERRORISM, WHICH HAD  
BEEN REDUCED TO INEFFECTIVENESS BY 1973. THIS NOTWITHSTANDING,  
THE GOU IN 1975 BEGAN A WIDE-SPREAD ROUNDUP OF COMMUNIST PARTY  
MEMBERS, ADHERENTS OF OTHER FAR LEFT POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, AND  
MARXIST LABOR LEADERS. ALTHOUGH ACCUSED OF "SEDITION" THE PRIN-  
CIPAL CRIME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS APPEARS IN MANY CASES TO HAVE  
BEEN THAT OF INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE  
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AT THE TIME THEY TOOK  
PLACE. THESE DETENTIONS, SOMETIMES INVOLVING PROLONGED  
"DISAPPEARANCES", WERE ACCCOMPANIED BY NUMEROUS WELL-DOCUMENTED  
CASES OF INTERROGATION BY TORTURE, AND OF DEATH WHILE IN  
CONFINEMENT. THIS PHENOMENON WAS ACCCOMPANIED BY THE RISE OF  
INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOU OF A CADRE OF ULTRA-RIGHTISTS,  
BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, WHO AGGRESSIVELY REJECTED RISING  
U.S. AND OTHER CRITICISM AND BEGAN TO PROGRESSIVELY DISMANTLE  
URUGUAY'S REMAINING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

URUGUAYAN INTRANSIGENCE AND THE PREDOMINANCE  
OF ULTRA-RIGHTIST HARDLINERS WITHIN THE GOU WAS FINALLY  
SHAKEN IN EARLY 1978 BY TWO EVENTS: ACCESSION AS ARMY CINC  
OF GENERAL GREGORIO ALVAREZ, WHO IS OPENLY COMMITTED TO A  
PROGRAM OF NORMALIZATION AND RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE; AND  
THE RUDE SHOCK OF OAS REJECTION,  
OF URUGUAY'S OFFER TO HOST THE JUNE 1978 GENERAL ASSEMBLY,  
BECAUSE OF URUGUAY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. SINCE THEN,  
THERE HAS BEEN A CLEARLY DISCERNIBLE GAIN IN INFLUENCE BY  
GOU'S MODERATES: THIS HAS BEEN MARKED BY A DECLINE IN  
ARRESTS AND REPORTS OF MISTREATMENT, PLUS MODEST BUT CONTINUING  
PROGRESS IN ENDING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND COMMITTING THE  
PRESENT GOU TO RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULE.

CONTRIBUTING TO CONVINCING URUGUAY'S MILITARY OF THE  
SERIOUSNESS OF U.S. CONCERN HAS BEEN OUR NEAR-COMPLETE  
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HOLD ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE COUPLED THIS WITH  
THE CLEARCUT MESSAGE THAT ANY REVIVAL OF UMS.-URUGUAYAN  
SECURITY COOPERATION DEPENDS ON THE GOU'S HUMAN RIGHTS  
RECORD. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN URUGUAY'S TRADITIONAL  
SUPPLIER, NO RELIABLE ALTERNATE SOURCE HAS YET BEEN DEVELOPED,

AND THE LOCAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT PARK HAS BEGUN TO DETERIORATE BADLY. THE PROPOSED LIMITED PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN THE MODEST SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP CALLED FOR IF URUGUAY IMPROVES ITS HUMAN RIGHTS IMAGE. NO MAP IS INCLUDED. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IS DEVOTED TO IMET TRAINING, WHICH WILL SERVE THE LONGER-RANGE GOAL OF MAINTAINING U.S. INFLUENCE WITH RISING MILITARY GENERATIONS. MOST OF THE FY 1979 PROGRAM IS DEVOTED TO FMS CREDITS. AS AT PRESENT, THE GOU WILL CONTINUE TO BE AWARE OF THE EXISTANCE OF THESE CREDITS BUT ACCESS TO THEM WILL REMAIN TIGHTLY CONTROLLED, PENDING CLEARCUT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GOU'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. THIS PROPOSED PROGRAM IS A KEY ELEMENT OF THE CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH URUGUAY, A STRATEGY WHICH CALLS FOR US TO FURTHER OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN BY RETAINING THE CAPACITY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT. SEE MONTEVIDEO A-2: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES - URUGUAY FOR A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THIS STRATEGY.

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12. OTHER-SOURCE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO URUGUAY IS CY 1977 TOTALLED \$146.5 MILLION: 139.4 IN FINANCIAL AID, 7.1 IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. A BREAKDOWN BY SOURCES (INCLUDING, FOR REFERNCE, OFFICIAL U.S. ASSISTANCE) FOLLOWS:

FINANCIAL AID 1977

SOURCE	TOTAL AVAILABLE	DISBURSED	UNDISBURSED
	FOR DISBURSEMENT		
IDB	\$110,706,500	\$26,156,100	\$84,550,400
IBRD	25,067,600	4,488,400	20,579,200
AID	6,419,300	464,800	5,954,500

ITALY	3,600,000	2,290,000	1,310,000
NETHERLANDS	30,000	N/A	N/A

TECHNICAL AID TO URUGUAY - 1977

TOTAL: \$ 7,103,707 (1976 - \$6,003,161)

BY DONORS:

SOURCE	AMOUNT	PERCENT OF TOTAL
UNITED NATIONAL	\$3,217,840	45.2
(OF WHICH UNDP: \$1,981,118)		
OTHER MULTILATERAL	1,731,092	24.3
OAS	1,051,627 PLUS \$87,600	
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IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER SOURCES

IDB	291,990
IBRD	7,400 PLUS 150,000

IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER SOURCES

BILATERAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL

INSTITUTIONS	2,154,775	30.3
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(OF WHICH

AID	382,000 PLUS 891,913
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IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER SOURCES

NON-U.S. BILATERAL	665,510
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PLUS AN UNEVALUATED PORTION)

OTHER-SOURCE MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS MINOR. BRAZIL, ARGENTINA  
AND CHILE OFFER A SMALL NUMBER OF TRAINING BILLETS, ON A  
NO-COST BASIS. BRAZIL PROVIDED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF  
COMMERCIAL-GRADE TRUCKS TO THE ARMY ON WHAT ARE BELIEVED  
TO HAVE BEEN COMMERCIAL TERMS. ARGENTINA HAS PROVIDED  
QUANTITIES OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, ALSO ON COMMERCIAL TERMS,  
AND A BATTERY OF RATHER OBSOLETE BUT FUNCTIONAL 75MM GUNS.

13. A. ALTERNATE PROGRAM LEVELS

LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL): \$0.7 MILLION (NO MAP; 0.2 IMET;  
0.5 FMS CREDITS).

A. DESCRIPTION: IMET FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD  
PROVIDE THE MAJORITY OF U.S.-BASED COURSES NOW URGENTLY  
NEEDED BY THE URUGUAYAN ARMED FORCES, AND WHICH HAVE BEEN  
UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE OF THE SUSPENSION OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
SINCE FY 1977. AT THIS FUNDING LEVEL OFFICERS WOULD BE SENT  
TO DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COURSES; THE NAVAL STAFF  
COURSE; INSTRUCTOR PILOT TRAINING AND INFANTRY/SIGNAL  
OFFICER ADVANCED SOURCES. FMS CREDIT AT THIS LEVEL WOULD  
PERMIT MINIMUM COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT FOR THE THREE  
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SERVICES THROUGH A LIMITED ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA COULD REDUCE THE OVERLOAD OF URUGUAY'S CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, CURRENTLY THE PRIMARY MEANS OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS, BY PROVIDING ALTERNATE MILITARY-ONLY FACILITIES.

B. RISK/BENEFIT ASSESSMENT - IMET FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL IS THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM TO PERMIT THE U.S. TO PLAY SOME ROLE IN THE PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF URUGUAYAN MILITARY. OFFICERS AT ALL GRADES WOULD STILL BE SENT FOR SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF FORMAL TRAINING TO ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, WITH A FEW MIDDLE-GRADE OFFICERS BEING TRAINED IN EUROPE, PRIMARILY ITALY. FMS CREDIT FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD NOT PERMIT URUGUAY TO PURCHASE VEHICLES OR SMALL ARMS NEEDED FOR MODERNIZATION, NOR WOULD IT PERMIT ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR EXISTING U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT. FAILURE TO FUND AT THIS LEVEL COULD AFFECT CONTINUING U.S. PORT/AIRFIELD USE AND ACCESS RIGHTS.

LEVEL 2. (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL): \$1.7 MILLION (NO MAP; 0.2 IMET, 1.5 FMS CREDITS).

A. DESCRIPTION - IMET FUNDING WOULD BE AT SAME LEVEL AS FOR MINIMUM PROGRAM. FMS CREDIT FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD, IN ADDITION TO BASIC LEVEL, PERMIT URUGUAYAN PURCHASES OF SMALL ARMS AND VEHICLES.

B. RISK/BENEFIT STATEMENT - THIS LEVEL WOULD NOT PERMIT THE SIMULTANEOUS PURCHASE OF FOLLOW-ON SPARES FOR

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EXISTING U.S. EQUIPMENT IN ALL THREE SERVICES TOGETHER  
WITH FULL AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS.

LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL): \$2.8 MILLION (NO MAP, 0.3 IMET;  
2.5 FMS CREDITS).

A. DESCRIPTION - FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL SHOULD FILL ALMOST  
ALL ONGOING URUGUAYAN REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY PROFESSIONAL  
EDUCATION FROM THE U.S. (SEPARATELY FUNDED CANAL ZOND MILITARY  
SCHOOLS WOULD BE USED TO PROVIDE NEEDED TECHNICIAN TRAINING  
FOR URUGUAY'S SMALL COMPLEMENT OF A-37B'S AND RIVER PATROL  
CRAFT.) LIMITED PURCHASES WOULD BE POSSIBLE OF EQUIPMENT,  
SPARES AND SUPPORT ITEMS TO MODERNIZE AND UPGRADE EFFICIENCY  
OF THE URUGUAYAN FORCE STRUCTURE.

B. RISK/BENEFIT STATEMENT - MODEST IMPROVEMENTS ARE  
PROVIDED FOR PRESENT PROBLEM AREAS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL,  
GROUND MOBILITY, COASTAL PATROL AND SECURITY, LOGISTICS AND  
MAINTENANCE. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL (IN CONJUNCTION WITH  
CANAL ZONE MILITARY SCHOOLS) WOULD ALSO REINSTATE THE U.S.  
AS PRIME SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EDUCATION TO URUGUAY, WITH A  
RESULTING REINFORCEMENT OF U.S. INFLUENCE OVER ITS ARMED  
FORCES.

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INCREMENTAL LEVEL: NONE.

B. MANNING LEVELS: CURRENT STAFFING FOR LOCAL SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION IS THREE U.S. MILITARY  
(OFFICER), ONE UMS. CIVILIAN AND THREE LWR EMPLOYEES.  
ONE ADDITIONAL U.S. CIVILIAN POSITION IS  
PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED BUT NOT FILLED. NO INCREASE IN  
AUTHORIZED LEVELS WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR ANY OF THE FUNDING  
LEVELS DISCUSSED ABOVE.

C. ESTIMATED FUTURE PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS:

(FIGURES IN \$ MILLIONS)

IMET MAP FMS CREDITS

FY 1980	0.3	---	2.5
FY 1981	0.3	---	2.5
FY 1982	0.3	---	2.5

NOTE: ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ABOVE PROGRAMS WOULD BE

DEPENDENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS AS EXPLAINED IN PARA

11.

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## Message Attributes

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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 jul 1978  
**Decapton Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decapton Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780304-0961  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** MONTEVIDEO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780723/aaaaatnr.tel  
**Line Count:** 551  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
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**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 40bb676d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 11  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 168320  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 01 jul 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1896357  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE: FY1980  
**TAGS:** MASS, MPOL, UY, US  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkvgwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/40bb676d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014